PER CURIAM.
The Attorney General appeals the circuit court's order finding the state grand jury lacks subject matter jurisdiction to investigate a violation of the Ethics, Government Accountability, and Campaign Reform Act
On February 14, 2013, the Attorney General received an ethics complaint, alleging possible violations of the Ethics Act by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Robert W. Harrell, Jr. (the Speaker), originally submitted by a private citizen to the House Legislative Ethics Committee (House Ethics Committee).
On February 24, 2014, the Speaker filed a motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the state grand jury investigation. On March 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion. Following that hearing, the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and another
By order dated May 12, 2014, the court found it — as presiding judge of the state grand jury — "lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction" to hear any matter arising from the Ethics Act, and refused to reach the issue of disqualification. In essence, the court found that because the complaint was civil in nature, the state grand jury lacked criminal jurisdiction to investigate, and likewise, the Attorney General lacked the authority to investigate absent a referral from the House Ethics Committee. More specifically, the court found "that ethics investigations concerning members and staff of the Legislature are solely within the Legislature's purview to the exclusion of the Courts," and, as such, any alleged criminal violations which arise out of the Ethics Act must be referred from the legislative investigative body to the Attorney General. Citing Rainey v. Haley, 404 S.C. 320, 327-28, 745 S.E.2d 81, 85 (2013), the court found the Attorney General's investigation "premature" because the Ethics Act's "administrative remedies have not been exhausted." Finally, the court held that its exercise of jurisdiction over the present action would contravene principles of the separation of powers. Thus, the court discharged the state grand jury and ordered the Attorney General to cease his criminal investigation.
"Appellate courts are bound by fact findings in response to motions preliminary to trial when the findings are supported by the evidence and not clearly wrong or controlled by error of law." State v. Amerson, 311 S.C. 316, 320, 428 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1993).
The Ethics Act is "a comprehensive statutory scheme for regulating the behavior of elected officials, public employees, lobbyists, and other individuals who present for public service." Rainey, 404 S.C. at 323, 745 S.E.2d at 83 (citations omitted).
To enforce the Ethics Act, the General Assembly created the State Ethics Commission and the Senate and House Legislative Ethics Committees. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 8-13-310,-510 (Supp.2013). "[T]he House and Senate Legislative Committees are charged with the exclusive responsibility for the handling of ethics complaints involving members of the General
The House Ethics Committee must conduct its investigation of a complaint filed pursuant to the Ethics Act in accordance with section 8-13-540. See S.C.Code Ann. § 8-13-540 (Supp. 2013). This section provides, in relevant part:
S.C.Code Ann. § 8-13-540(1)(a)-(b). Following a formal hearing, if the committee finds that a member has violated the Ethics Act, the Act requires the committee to:
S.C.Code Ann. § 8-13-540(3)(a)-(d) (emphasis added).
The circuit court read into section 8-13-540(3)(d) a requirement that a House Ethics Committee investigation and referral occur prior to the Attorney General's initiation of his own criminal investigation, which the Attorney General argues was clearly erroneous in light of our constitution and this Court's precedents. We agree.
In State v. Thrift, this Court announced that legislative jurisdiction over violations of the Ethics Act is civil in nature. See Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994). There, the State appealed a pre-trial order of the circuit court dismissing the indictments against multiple defendants charged with public
Noting that the State possesses "wide latitude in selecting what cases to prosecute and what cases to plea bargain," the Court observed that the Attorney General's authority to prosecute derives from our state constitution and thus "cannot be impaired by legislation." Thrift, 312 S.C. at 307, 440 S.E.2d at 355; see S.C. Const. art. V, § 24 (providing that "[t]he Attorney General shall be the chief prosecuting officer of the State with authority to supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases in courts of record"). Therefore, the Court deemed any requirement placing the power "to supervise the prosecution of a criminal case in the hands of the Ethics Commission" unconstitutional. Id.
However, "by recognizing the civil nature of the Ethics Act complaint," the Court avoided the constitutional problem caused by the referral language of the old scheme, and concluded:
Id. (emphasis added).
Rather than looking to Thrift, the circuit court found that the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, relying on the more recent case, Rainey v. Haley. See 404 S.C. at 322, 745 S.E.2d at 82.
In Rainey, the appellant sought a civil declaratory judgment in the court of common pleas that Governor Nikki Haley was criminally culpable for ethical violations allegedly committed
Other than the particular situation defined in section 8-13-530(4), we stated "the Legislature has granted exclusive authority over ethical complaints to the appropriate Ethics Committee" and "it is therefore clear the Legislature intended the respective Ethics Committee to otherwise have exclusive authority to hear alleged ethics violations of its own members and staff." Id. at 325-26, 745 S.E.2d at 84. Finally, we opined:
Id. at 326-27, 745 S.E.2d at 84-85 (footnotes omitted) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the circuit court placed great significance on the "exclusivity" language in Rainey, but failed to consider that case in context: a civil declaratory judgment action. Rainey does not affect the clear and unambiguous holding of Thrift, as
While the Speaker concedes that Thrift applies here, he contends that the Attorney General mischaracterizes the circuit court's order, asserting that because the court found that the allegations were "conclusively within the Ethics Code" and the "Attorney General has failed to offer or present to the Court any evidence or allegations which are criminal in nature," in the absence of evidence of conduct constituting a crime, neither the Attorney General nor the state grand jury investigations may proceed without a referral from the House Ethics Committee.
The problem with the Speaker's argument is that it presumes that any complaint originating as a violation of the Ethics Act can never be criminal in nature. To the contrary, section 8-13-1520 provides:
S.C.Code Ann. § 8-13-1520 (Supp.2013). Thus, the Ethics Act criminalizes violations, and it is in the Attorney General's
312 S.C. at 291-92, 440 S.E.2d at 346-47 (footnotes omitted).
The House Ethics Committee's concurrent civil regulatory authority does not affect the Attorney General's authority to initiate a criminal investigation in any way, whether or not there is a referral, or even a pending House investigation. We liken the House Ethics Committee's authority to govern its members to that of the legal, medical, or any other professional field where, by virtue of receiving a license to practice the profession, the member's behavior is policed by a professional organization. For example, a doctor is subject to oversight by the South Carolina Board of Medical Examiners (the Board) and may have his or her medical license rescinded in disciplinary proceedings, while simultaneously being the focus of a criminal investigation and prosecution, all for the same behavior. Just as a decision (or lack thereof) by the Board would not delay or interrupt a concurrent criminal investigation, the status of a House Ethics Committee investigation cannot affect the Attorney General's decision regarding a criminal prosecution. Thus, we find that the Attorney General's investigation is not circumscribed by the nature of
Therefore, the circuit court erred in concluding that the House Ethics Committee has exclusive jurisdiction over this complaint.
Having decided that the court erred in finding it was without jurisdiction as presiding judge of the state grand jury to hear these matters, we reiterate that while its rationale was misplaced, the court acted well within its statutory authority in assessing the jurisdiction of the state grand jury beyond the impanelment stage.
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." Skinner v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 380 S.C. 91, 93, 668 S.E.2d 795, 796 (2008) (citations omitted). "South Carolina circuit courts are vested with original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, except those cases in which exclusive jurisdiction shall be given to inferior courts, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as provided by law." Rainey, 404 S.C. at 323, 745 S.E.2d at 83 (citing S.C. Const. art. V, § 11). "In determining whether the Legislature has given another entity exclusive jurisdiction over a case, a court must look to the relevant statute." Id. (quoting Dema v. Tenet Physician Servs. — Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 115, 121, 678 S.E.2d 430, 433 (2009)).
The state grand jury's authority "extends throughout the State." S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1630(A) (Supp.2013). However, despite its statewide reach, "its jurisdiction is limited to certain offenses" enumerated in section 14-7-1630. State v. Wilson, 315 S.C. 289, 291, 433 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1993) (citation omitted). Relevant to this case, the subject matter jurisdiction of a state grand jury covers "a crime, statutory, common law or other, involving public corruption as defined in [s]ection 14-7-1615,[
The Attorney General may seek impanelment of the state grand jury "[w]henever the Attorney General and the Chief of [SLED] consider it necessary and normal investigative or prosecutorial procedures are not adequate." Id. § 14-7-1630(B).
In such a case, "the Attorney General may petition in writing to the chief administrative judge of the judicial circuit in which he seeks to impanel a state grand jury for an order impaneling a state grand jury." Id. § 14-7-1630(B) (Supp. 2013). The petition for impanelment "must allege the type of offenses to be inquired into" and "in all instances must specify that the public interest is served by the impanelment." Id. After "due consideration," the impaneling judge "may order the impanelment of a state grand jury in accordance with the petition for a term of twelve calendar months." Id. § 14-7-1630(D).
Once impaneled, the statute further charges the presiding judge of the state grand jury to hear matters pertaining to the state grand jury proceedings:
Id. § 14-7-1730 (Supp.2013). Moreover,
Id. § 14-7-1630(G).
Plainly, the statute contemplates assessment of jurisdiction by the presiding judge beyond the impanelment stage and discharging the state grand jury as a possible outcome.
While the crime of public corruption could include violations of the Ethics Act, the state grand jury's jurisdiction is confined to the purposes set forth in the constitution and the state grand jury statute, as circumscribed by the impaneling order. While we reverse the circuit court's order, we in no way suggest that it was error for the presiding judge to inquire whether the state grand jury was "conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity." S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1630(G); cf. Thrift, 312 S.C. at 311 n. 15, 440 S.E.2d at 357 n. 15 (noting that "[t]he grand jury is more than a mere instrument of the prosecution").
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court order, and remand this case to the circuit court for a decision on whether the Attorney General should be disqualified from participating in these state grand jury proceedings.
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.
S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1615(B)(1)-(3) (Supp.2013).